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Geopolitics, national security considerations and resource sovereignty are increasingly defining the mining and metals markets in 2026.
1. Mining as national security imperative
Sustained global insecurity will drive demand for defence-related critical minerals in 2026. Governments will deepen their involvement in critical mineral markets due to national security imperatives, including expanding strategic reserves, state-backed stockpiling and export controls.
In the US, the One Big Beautiful Bill Act includes USD 2bn to bolster national defence stockpiles of critical minerals, which the DOD intends to spend by early 2027, and another USD 5bn for defence investments in critical minerals supply chains.
On 3 February, the administration launched “Project Vault”, a USD 12bn initiative to create a critical mineral stockpile. It has also begun taking equity stakes in US-based strategic mineral companies, with the July 2025 acquisition of a 15% stake in rare earth producer MP Materials sparking a rush for US government funding among US miners. The EU is struggling to catch up on stockpiling but has seized the issue and plans a joint purchasing and stockpiling effort in 2026, while some European countries are also pursuing national-level plans to develop mineral stockpiles.
Larger purchases by state-backed bodies will amplify commodity price swings for strategic materials, affecting project finance assumptions. Governments taking equity stakes could raise reputational and political risks for mining and metals companies, while there may be an increase in opportunities for joint ventures with state-backed entities, as well as defence contractors. Military-linked supply chains may also trigger scrutiny from investors and NGOs, increasing compliance and transparency costs for the mining sector.
2. Rare earths take the political centre stage
After trade disputes in 2025 showed the importance of rare earths elements (REE) as China’s main leverage against the US, we can expect the political focus on rare earths to further intensify in 2026. This will lead to frequent state interventions in these niche markets, ranging from policy support to price floors, offtake agreements and direct equity investments.
A coordinated G7 price floor for rare earths is likely to be implemented in 2026, aiming to reduce dependence on China. While this is likely to disproportionately benefit junior developers, given the small size and uncertain economics of these projects, majors will come under growing political pressure to throw their weight behind rare earths plans.
Meanwhile, countries will continue to wield trade restrictions on critical minerals and rare earths as part of broader geopolitical tensions. Most recently, on 9 January, China reportedly began to restrict exports of civilian-use rare earths to Japan following comments by Japan’s Prime Minister, Sanae Takaichi, about Taiwan.
3. The US pushes to increase domestic mining production and financing
The Trump administration will accelerate efforts to increase domestic mine production and processing capacity, using various levers to pull projects forward. After several steps in 2025 to fast-track permitting and allocate funding to US-based producers and processors, we expect capital to start ramping up in 2026 in response to these policy signals, and the improved coordination between US federal agencies.
The Department of Energy’s new funding rounds should favour by-product recovery and processing capacity. The risk is a lack of coherence and prioritisation, with the administration pursuing interventions in a long list of minerals labelled as critical.
In parallel, US (and Western) moves to inject funding into the minerals sector will open major opportunities for private market investors, which will present their funds as avenues for Western governments to rapidly scale up into the natural resources space. US banks are also likely to ramp up financing of mining projects, following JPMorgan’s plans to invest up to USD 10bn in national security projects.
4. Transactional mineral alliances
At the same time, the US will continue to rely on foreign mining partners, driving transactional agreements seeking to direct supply away from China and toward the US market. Australia is emerging as a key partner in US efforts to foster a non-Chinese supply line of critical minerals, with joint agreements likely to provide fiscal and policy support for companies. The US has also solidified critical minerals partnerships with Japan and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), making US mineral security a key pillar of bilateral engagements.
More broadly, in 2026, alliances aimed at securing raw resources for emerging technologies will broaden in scope and diversify in partnerships. The US is pivoting to integrate AI-related supply chains, announcing on 12 December an alliance with eight resource-rich or semiconductor hubs: Japan, South Korea, Singapore, the Netherlands, the UK, Israel, the UAE and Australia. Meanwhile, China’s International Economic and Trade Cooperation Initiative on Green Mining and Minerals, with 19 developing nations and a UN body signals, continued dominance in mineral processing under a multilateral banner. Advanced economies will accelerate investment and harmonise standards via the G7 Critical Minerals Action Plan and the Canada-led Production Alliance, driving capital and innovation into critical mineral mining.
Businesses that are reliant on critical minerals – such as in the automotive and technology sectors – must anticipate new agreements spanning minerals and broader supply chain components, including logistics and recycling. The continued fortification of alliances in these areas will increase pressure on companies directly involved in areas such as resource extraction and manufacturing to be politically aligned with one or the other alliance.
5. Concerns over a widening copper supply gap
Copper prices reached an all-time high in early 2026 on expectations of major supply deficits this year. Disruptions at large copper mines in 2025 cut global output by about 5% and highlighted the fragility of supply, as new supply add-ons cannot keep pace with demand, which even according to the most conservative forecasts is expected to grow by over 30% by 2040. Governments are putting their money where their mouth is on the energy transition, with new grid build-outs, electrification, electric vehicles and data centres largely surpassing expectations. This means that unless new supply and cost-competitive recycling accelerate, copper prices will rise even further.
This outlook explains why governments are stockpiling and securing direct access to supply chains. In November, the US Geological Survey added copper to its critical minerals list, enabling funding incentives and streamlining permitting for exploration and processing. While nominally these policy moves are domestic in focus, it will likely also spur outward investment and develop more homegrown mining champions who can compete abroad. The recent multi-billion-dollar partnership between Orion Resource Partners and the US Development Finance Corporation (DFC) is a case in point.
The mining majors are also blinkered on copper. Yet, the long lead-times of copper projects mean miners still favour leveraging efficiencies of scale at operating assets, a dynamic which is driving the return of large-scale M&A. Mining mergers look set to continue in 2026 and copper is at the core of this agenda, as Anglo American and Teck Resources likely complete their merger and Rio Tinto and Glencore pursue talks.
6. Geopolitical instability sustains the gold rally
After a record year in 2025, gold is likely to consolidate at this new normal in 2026. The leap above USD 5,000/oz in January 2026 amid Greenland tensions confirms its position as the market’s default hedge. The rally is not only driven by investor fears, but by structural moves by central banks to diversify their holdings and put a premium on sanction-resilient reserves.
For junior gold miners, a sustained high-price environment in 2026 should translate into exceptional free cash flow, allowing them to consolidate their balance sheets and pursue expansions or targeted M&A rather than face being cannibalised. This will likely create a more diversified market with new champions emerging in 2026.
However, the gold frenzy also gives host governments leverage to harden their stance, pushing for increased royalties, local content, licence reviews and retroactive taxation. Disputes over contract terms and regulatory changes, and the relative speed with which gold mines can be developed, means we will likely see a spike in gold-focused arbitration. We also expect the emergence of more state-owned gold mining companies in exporting countries.
7. Is nuclear renewal still on the cards?
In 2025, we saw energy-security shocks and the AI-driven power crunch bring nuclear energy back to the centre of industrial policy. Energy supply is now vital to the geopolitical calculus, and nuclear power’s high reliability and low land density requirements is still an attractive argument. While this is all true in theory, the long timelines for development, the very strict regulation of new uranium mining and local opposition has meant that we are yet to see this translate into an actual shift in the energy mix.
Nuclear is, in fact, at its lowest point in the last 40 years in terms of its proportional contribution to the energy mix. China may be one of few exceptions to this rule, but even there nuclear accounts for only 2% or so of the total energy mix. It is also easily dwarfed in new capacity add-ons by solar and wind, where China is dominant on IP and low-cost manufacturing.
The uranium supply chain also remains heavily concentrated, with Kazakhstan, Canada, Namibia and Uzbekistan together accounting for over 75% of global mined supply. Supply will remain fragile in 2026 with Kazakhstan, the swing producer, planning a 10% production cut this year. A high-price and a security-driven market should reward producers, but it remains to be seen whether this will actually trigger a ramp-up of uranium mining.
8. Critical mineral realities drive the push for circularity
Western governments with high reliance on critical mineral supply from geopolitical adversaries – mainly China – are likely to step up circularity initiatives in mining value chains in 2026. Sustained trade tensions underscore the clear frailties to supply disruptions, especially for automotive, manufacturing, defence and technology sectors in the EU and India. For example, several European automotive firms were forced to halt production and implement layoffs due to escalating US-China trade restrictions on rare earths throughout 2025. Similarly, an electric automotive manufacturer in India halved its output of electric scooters due to rare earths shortages.
The viability of government circularity targets relating to critical minerals is aided by the narrowing gap in the economics of recycling versus primary raw materials. In cases where scale and logistical connectivity can be maximised, scrap aluminium and steel can be significantly cheaper than primary material. The hard part remains efficient collection and sorting, which can fluctuate wildly. Indeed, the vast majority of end-of-life metal still ends up in landfill, where it is often too costly to retrieve and process competitively. But recycling still has one major thing going for it: margins are generally more predictable as scrap markets tend to display narrower price volatility, even if they do track primary commodity price swings.
We expect a pickup in export restrictions on recyclable materials while boosting financial incentives for innovation in metals recycling. The EU on 3 December announced plans to restrict exports of rare earth waste and battery scrap from early 2026. The UK’s November Critical Mineral Strategy also announced plans to recycle 20% of critical minerals by 2035. India, through its National Critical Mineral Mission, will launch an incentive programme to boost recycling between 2026-31.
9. Illegal mining rampant as prices soar
Illegal mining and trade will accelerate globally in 2026, driven by high commodity prices in artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) supply chains. The temptation to bypass legal means of ASM is higher than ever in gold and copper supply chains, with prices reaching all-time highs in January 2026. Governments and miners face an uphill battle to formalise ASM networks, as weak incentive structures, political corruption and lax state enforcement capacity compound the problem.
When coupled with a global loosening of the rules-based order, weak governance, and the growth of organised criminal groups (OCGs), miners have their work cut out to ensure they stay on the right side of security and human rights practices, and to prevent illegal mining from causing serious shutdowns or operational disruption. Major gold plays facing the surge of illegal mining activity include the Andean region (Peru, Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia), West and Central Africa (Ghana, DRC) and the Amazon basin (Brazil).
OCGs are increasingly involved in illegal mining, using it as a source of financing to expand their influence. Miners must thus ensure they build trust with state authorities to limit their level of exposure, but equally they will require auxiliary, private solutions where state security is left wanting. This involvement fuels security threats, including violence, extortion, kidnapping, and territorial disputes, posing significant risks to formal mining operations, personnel, and communities. The significant rise of OCGs in the mining sector aligns with Control Risks outlook of organised crime being a top global risk in 2026.
Governments will likely continue to be undermined by vested interests, the political influence of informal miners, and resource constraints. Amid these constraints, governments and miners are trying to advance the formalisation of informal mining networks, through various registries and laws. However, there needs to be better incentive structures for ASM as weak enforcement capacity means governments bark louder than they bite.
10. Climate and environmental constraints harden
Despite a political backlash against ESG, global capital and trade rules still push miners towards demonstrable environmental and climate governance. Regulatory pressures on companies will harden in 2026. Tailings governance is becoming a board-level liability: a November 2025 ruling by the UK High Court on the 2015 Mariana dam collapse highlighted extra-territorial risks for environmental disasters, and is likely to fuel copycat claims, underwritten by specialist litigation finance.
2026 has also seen the definitive entry into force of the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM). With certificate purchases for 2026 imports pushed into 2027, steel and aluminium buyers will demand auditable emissions data and favour lower-carbon inputs. In 2026, miners and smelters feeding these chains will feel pressure to decarbonise their operations.