Islamist militant groups’ ongoing campaign to weaken state control in Mali has increased the threat of militant activity along the Senegalese border, particularly in the border areas of the Tambacounda and Kédougou regions. This article explores the potential for spill over into Senegal’s border areas and interior.
While cross-border threats in Tambacounda and Kédougou are likely to continue, Control Risks assesses that militant groups are unlikely to target deeper areas of Senegalese territory in the near term. These groups will likely continue to prioritise destabilising Mali rather than opening new fronts in Senegal.
Senegal’s army and security forces will likely remain well-trained, well-equipped and professional. They continue to enjoy broad public support, which is needed to facilitate community cooperation and to gain access to human intelligence - both critical for effective counterterrorism operations.
The Senegalese government is also expected to maintain positive ties with Mali and Mauritania, with regular joint patrols and intelligence-sharing operations along shared borders likely to persist in the coming months.
A record of recent attacks
On 1 July, coordinated militant attacks targeted military positions across several towns in central and western Mali, resulting in the death of at least one civilian. Among the locations hit was Diboli (Kayes region, Mali), a town situated near the Senegalese border and less than 500 metres from Kidira (Tambacounda region, Senegal). Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM), an al-Qaida affiliate, claimed responsibility. No further attacks near the Senegalese border have been recorded since.
While there have been no recorded attacks by militant Islamist groups within Senegal's borders, the growing militant presence along the Mali border signals a clear intent and potential for infiltration. In 2021, Senegalese authorities imprisoned four men from Kidira on charges of “criminal conspiracy” and “acts of support for terrorism”. They were suspected of belonging to a group linked to JNIM, pointing to efforts to establish a rear base in Senegal for Mali operations.
Looking ahead, Islamist militant groups are likely to be motivated to expand their presence in Senegal as part of a broader strategy to secure logistical access to the Atlantic coast.
Army's response and risk mitigation
The Senegalese authorities have strengthened their military’s presence in regions bordering Mali in response to the militant threat in recent years. A Senegal Armed Forces military base in Goudiry (Tambacounda region), opened in 2022, oversees operations across Tambacounda and Kédougou, which fall within Senegal’s Military Zone No. 2. Rapid Action Surveillance and Intervention Group (GARSI) units, composed of gendarmerie elements, are regularly deployed to secure remote border areas, notably Kidira.
In response to the incident in Diboli, Senegalese security forces have further reinforced their presence along the Mali border. GARSI and army units were sent to the area in early July, and new Gendarmerie Legion units were inaugurated in Kédougou on 1 August. These units conducted large-scale security operations in the area.
Meanwhile, on 24 July, prefectural authorities banned the circulation of motorcycles and mopeds in Bakel (Tambacounda region, near the borders with Mauritania and Mali) between midnight and 6:00 a.m. local time, effective from 24 July to 24 August, citing security concerns.
According to Control Risks’ local sources, both the army and other security forces are well equipped and trained in their ability to respond to potential threats. Moreover, they are generally well regarded by the population. This positive perception increases the likelihood of effective collaboration with local communities, particularly in cases where security forces would require intelligence from locals.
The Senegalese government maintains strong and productive relations with both the Malian and Mauritanian governments. The respective armed forces regularly carry out joint patrols and intelligence-sharing exercises along their shared borders. These positive relations are likely to continue in the coming months, supporting sustained security cooperation and counterterrorism capabilities.
Factors driving radicalisation
Despite the professionalism and reported preparedness of Senegalese security forces, several factors increase the vulnerability of local communities to radicalisation and recruitment by militant groups that could strengthen militants’ presence and ability to infiltrate the Tambacounda and Kédougou regions in the coming months.
Islamist militant groups are likely to attempt to exploit the persistence of socio-economic grievances, particularly in border regions. Both regions suffer from limited infrastructure and insufficient government investment despite being rich in natural resources, notably gold. These groups are known to infiltrate areas where state institutions are perceived as absent or ineffective, often stepping in to fill gaps in provision by providing basic infrastructure such as wells, electricity and other essential services. While there is no record of groups implementing this strategy yet in Senegal, this would enable them to gain local support and legitimacy, positioning themselves as an alternative to the state.
The continued presence of caste-based social structures in several communities in both regions also exacerbates existing economic inequalities. As the caste system is not recognised in Islam, Islamist militant groups may seek to leverage this issue by promoting narratives of unity and social justice to attract support from marginalised groups.
Another potential trigger for radicalisation and recruitment is the ongoing tension in both regions between herders and farmers, particularly over land use. Should the authorities in the coming months resolve disputes in a way perceived as favouring one group over another, Islamist militant groups could capitalise on feelings of injustice and abandonment to fuel recruitment, spread their ideology, and build momentum in these vulnerable areas.
Strategic outlook
Recent attacks in Mali come amid a campaign by JNIM to weaken the presence of Malian security forces and expand its footprint in the western and southern regions of Mali, including along the Senegalese and Mauritanian borders. In the coming months, further militant attacks are highly likely in western areas of Mali, particularly in the form of small-scale attacks targeting security forces in rural areas.
Therefore, the border regions of Senegal and Mauritania are expected to face a heightened exposure to terrorist threats in the coming years. The primary threat will stem from militant groups using Senegalese territory as a logistical and operational support zone for their activities in Mali.
Despite the vulnerabilities of communities in these border areas, Senegal’s broader political and socio-economic environment has not yet shown signs of institutional fragility that would allow Islamist militant groups to exploit weak points for direct attacks within Senegalese territory. Consequently, our terrorism risk rating for Senegal remains LOW.
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Author: Susanna Eusebi