When the United States and Israel commenced aerial attacks against Iran on February 28 2026, the Middle East descended into a significant air war. Retaliatory Iranian ballistic missile, cruise missile and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) attacks demonstrated that Arabian Gulf neighbours were considered legitimate targets and aerial threats no longer only apply solely to Israel.
Despite some historical attacks by regional Iranian proxies on Saudi Arabia and the UAE, threat and risk assessments for new and existing building projects tend to put direct Iranian or even proxy aerial attacks lower on both threat and risk spectra. The current conflict has shattered the underlying assumptions for those risk assessments, and Gulf States may need to look at a “new normal” of occasional Iranian aerial attacks.
Adjusting to a changed risk landscape
Conventional risk management recommendations for aerial attacks typically transfer those risks to national security entities and generally do not recommend building owners and developers to consider hardening structures. This guidance may need to change. Building owners, design teams and operators obviously cannot be responsible for intercepting or responding to attacks but should consider building level protection to reduce exposure to adverse consequences.
Throughout the conflict, Gulf country governmental guidance to aerial attack incoming and interception is to shelter in place by seeking refuge in non-glazed and heavier structured buildings. While Gulf country air defences have proven highly effective with overall interception rates between 90-98%, some projectiles do get through layered air defences, most being the Shahed UAVs. Intercepted projectiles can result in falling debris, and downed UAVs can still detonate, resulting in damage to buildings or death and injury to people.
Thus far, Iran has claimed to focus its attacks in Gulf countries on facilities and areas that are associated with US and Israeli military and economic interests. US military bases are actively targeted, but so are host-nation military bases, civil seaports and airports infrastructure, oil and gas production, storage, shipping terminals, industrial areas, and data centres. However, other facilities and buildings have been impacted including luxury hotels, high-rise commercial office buildings, and residential areas with varying levels of damage and injury to people. Whether these were directly targeted or simply collateral damage within flight paths to other “legitimate targets” is not clear.
Rethinking exposure in a potential “new normal”
Although the likelihood of being impacted by an Iranian projectile is still significantly lower than being in a fatal or injurious vehicle accident in the Gulf, this conflict has highlighted a new reality. Development and asset owners’ buildings and occupants may become inadvertent targets and face damage, destruction, and personal harm. It is not suggested that every building in every asset class or typology consider structural or façade protection, but some asset typologies are worth considering. It is also not expected that all existing buildings will be capable of retrofit protection, but there are some measures that may be worth considering.
In this new normal, buildings considered to be “crowded places” in categories like hotels and resorts, major shopping centres, stadia, and schools are currently attractive to terrorist attacks. These types of assets are critical to Gulf States’ economies or supporting those economies. If the guidance is to shelter in place, then large crowds sheltering should be better protected. Incorporating additional protective measures for aerial threats also results in positive externalities in reduced risk against credible terrorism threats and vice versa.
Embedding resilience into new and existing buildings
For new buildings, hardened or more reinforced structures, elevations and roofs can provide enhanced protection from debris or downed drones. Glazed facades could and perhaps should be considered for enhanced blast protection in glazing thickness, internal polyvinyl butyral (PVB) layers, and anchoring systems. Independent parking structures, or those within buildings, can and should be structurally hardened to provide areas for shelter in place or areas of refuge for those caught in the open during an incoming alert. This not only helps mitigate risks from aerial attacks, but also extant terrorist vehicle-borne explosive attack methods, enabling higher levels of resilience.
For existing buildings, structural enhancement is often not possible or feasible. However, glazing can be fitted with anti-shatter film that limits secondary fragmentation resulting from nearby impacts. Whatever the case may be, it is worthwhile for asset owners and operators to seek professional security consultant advice in assessing risks, informing risk-proportionate decision-making, and providing pragmatic solutions for better inherent protection in this potential new normal.