Elections increasingly attract cyber operations that target politicians, businesses and the public. These activities range from espionage campaigns against political parties, to influence operations seeking to shape opinions, sow discontent or undermine democratic processes.
This newsletter, published twice a month, provides an overview of key cyber incidents and emerging threats related to the upcoming October 2026 general elections in Brazil. It offers recommendations on how organizations and individuals can mitigate and protect against these threats.
Key incidents
In this issue we focus on:
Slovenia confirms “foreign influence” in recent parliamentary elections
On 26 March 2026, the Slovenian Intelligence and Security Agency (SOVA) announced it had “unequivocally confirmed foreign influences” on the nation’s parliamentary elections, which were held the previous weekend.
Brazilian workers utilizing AI at a greater rate than contemporaries in other major economiesAccording to a PwC survey of almost 50,000 workers in some 48 countries, Brazilian professionals were significantly more likely to use AI tools on a regular basis and also reported higher-levels of satisfaction with the outputs and perceived productivity gains achieved.
71% of Brazilian professionals report using at least one AI tool at work in the past year.
(Source: PwC “Global Hopes and Fears” 2025 report)
This was the highest rate of adoption reported of any country included in the study and some 17% above the global average (54%).
Mitigation advice twice a month
- Organizations should establish clear internal policies governing the acceptable use of generative AI. This includes guidance on data inputs, output validation, intellectual property considerations, and ethical boundaries in order to reduce legal, regulatory and reputational exposure during a sensitive election cycle.
- Be alert to attempts by external actors (whether state-linked or commercially motivated) to manipulate narratives, leak information, or pressure companies indirectly as part of wider election-related influence strategies.
- Plan for rapid response and escalation of information incidents. Develop and implement clear internal escalation paths and response plans for information incidents, enabling timely decision-making and external engagement if required.
- Reinforce cybersecurity controls, particularly around corporate communications, executive accounts and sensitive information that could be exploited or weaponized as part of broader influence or disinformation efforts.
- Actively monitor digital channels, including social media and messaging platforms, for false, misleading, or deliberately deceptive content that could affect corporate reputation, employees, customers or business operations.
- Strengthen internal communications and training that help staff recognize manipulated content, coordinated inauthentic behavior, and AI-generated media, reducing the likelihood that employees inadvertently amplify harmful narratives
Slovenian intelligence agency (SOVA) claims confirmed "foreign influences" in recent elections
- 26 March 2026: Following a meeting of its National Security Council, the Slovenian government announced that SOVA had “presented concrete activities of a foreign para-intelligence agency as well as contacts with Slovenian entities.” While it was not clear to which agency the statement was referring, allegations during the hard-fought electoral campaign swirled around the opposition Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS) and a private Israeli intelligence firm, Black Cube. Slovenian activists and journalists claimed that covert videos and secret recordings were leaked to embarrass the ruling party and sway voter sentiment during an extremely tight campaign. The leader of the opposition SDS party has acknowledged meeting with representatives from Black Cube but has denied any wrongdoing.
- Potential impact: Potential foreign influence in the upcoming October 2026 election in Brazil – whether conducted by sophisticated nation-state actors or financially-motivated private entities – is highly-likely to occur, and previous efforts to tip the scales for one side or the other have been well-documented. With the increasing prevalence of AI and deepfake technology, moreover, efforts at misinformation (false, inaccurate, or misleading information) or disinformation (false information deliberately created and spread to deceive and cause harm) are likely to be even more pronounced.
Brazilian workers utilizing AI at a greater rate than contemporaries in other major economies
- The results of the PwC study suggest that the adoption of AI tools by Brazilian workers is more intensive than among their peers in other countries, as 26% reported using generative AI tools on a daily basis – which was almost twice the average global rate (14%). According to the report, 83% of Brazilian professionals claimed that AI improved the quality of their work, and some 79% claimed significant productivity gains, with both of these numbers being marginally higher than global averages. Finally, approximately 61% of Brazilian workers expected technological advancements to affect their jobs within the next three years, pointing to potential concerns about job security as an impetus for the early adoption of AI.
- Potential impact: As with the potential use of AI for mis- or disinformation in the lead-up to the October 2026 elections, the rapid but somewhat unregulated adoption of AI tools by Brazilian professionals could lead to significant legal and ethical exposure for individuals and companies alike. Effective governance of AI tools will be key, as well as enhanced monitoring during the upcoming election cycle.
Focus on: Increasing concerns about foreign election interference around the world
- Concerns around foreign interference in elections obviously stretch well beyond Slovenia and Brazil and, with the advent of the digital age, have become ubiquitous and truly global in scale. To be sure, countries that are highly-connected and on the front lines of today’s geopolitical instability are likely to be most exposed to such malign influences, but no country is immune; they vary only in terms of the focus and intensity of external interference. Likewise, there is no one-size-fits-all antidote to combat such efforts, as the guise of such foreign election interference can take a variety of forms, ranging from fairly benign statements by interested foreign leaders to concerted and intensive efforts by nation-state sponsored actors to deceive voters.
- Potential remedies: Nevertheless, steps can be taken to minimize the impact of such foreign influence operations, including the hardening of election infrastructure and communications, the rapid attribution and public disclosure of such efforts, disruption of coordinated inauthentic behavior (networks of fake accounts), and increasing the media and information literacy of target populations. In general, long-term resilience can only be achieved when voters are able to effectively evaluate information for themselves, and this requirement becomes even more acute as AI-generated content continues to grow in sophistication.
Electoral protection in Brazil: cybersecurity training and support
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