Part 1 of a two-part series on operational security lessons from the US-Iran conflict. In Part 2: The shift to intelligence-led operations, we explore how intelligence-led decision-making made the difference, and what organisations should do next.
The geopolitical fallout from the US-Iran conflict proved to many organisations that simply having a plan is not the same as being ready. In the days following the outbreak of hostilities on 28 February, many found critical gaps between their security strategies and their ability to act on them. The most important lesson from the US-Iran conflict is not that organisations were unprepared - it is that ‘preparedness’ and ‘readiness’ are different things, and the gap between them is where crises are won or lost.
Preparedness is the desktop work: playbooks, scenario planning, crisis management plans and business continuity plans. Whereas readiness is the ability to enact those plans by having the resources and arrangements in place to do so effectively. Once missiles and drones replaced theoretical scenarios of what may or may not be possible, that distinction stopped being academic.
Plans don’t move people
Many organisations we supported reached a moment of realisation: they were prepared on paper, but lacked the resources, arrangements and capabilities needed to put their plans into action. Leadership teams suddenly faced seemingly simplequestions: Who were our essential and non-essential people? Could we move the non-essential staff within our 5,000-strong workforce to safer locations? Do we have evacuation plans, vehicles, logistics and intelligence on border conditions to act safely and quickly? Boardroom demeanours quickly shifted as executives recognised the scale of the challenge.
Readiness depends on several key elements, including the intelligence arrangements required to support critical decisions and the logistics needed to execute them -including vehicles, access to providers and key subcontractors. Without those, a plan is a statement of intent rather than a capability.
Why the gap opened
Two patterns explain why otherwise capable organisations were not ready.
- The compliance trap. Some organisations treated preparedness as a box to tick against regional and international standards, or as addressing an action in a Board risk presentation. Having met the minimum standard, they assumed the work was done, largely unaware that a further step - readiness - existed at all.
- The "safe location" assumption. Most believed a conflict of this kind was implausible in a part of the Middle East that was widely regarded as stable and low risk. While it could be argued that they were right, those who had operated in the region for decades seemed to be better prepared. Multinationals with prior conflict experience were better prepared than their Gulf-headquartered counterparts: many had learned from experiences elsewhere that preparedness without readiness is incomplete.
There is a third, structural constraint that compounds both patterns. Leading practice advises that it is not logistically possible for organisations to predefine and prepare for every possible risk scenario – and that they should instead follow the mantra of being prepared for anything. However, most organisations have limited capacity to do so. Readiness, in practice, is a contested resource and it carries a premium.
Where readiness broke down in practice
The US-Iran conflict converted abstract weaknesses into concrete failures. Three stand out.
Intelligence was used for reporting rather than decision-making. In many cases, intelligence functions focused on explaining what had happened rather than informing what should happen next. As a result, leaders and intelligence teams had not clearly identified the operational decisions intelligence needed to support, nor had they built monitoring frameworks around the indicators that would inform those decisions. Instead, reporting often centred on readily available information, limiting its value as a tool for action and decision-support.
Logistical challenges. In many cases, organisations reacted hastily, securing vehicles and evacuation assets without fully considering the practical constraints on the ground. Vehicles arrived at border crossings lacking the documentation required for onward travel, leaving evacuees stranded, forced to turn back, or to continue their journey on foot before arranging alternative transport. At the same time, intense demand for a limited pool of charter aircraft led to inflated costs, while airspace restrictions and prioritisation of commercial traffic caused significant delays. In hindsight, a more measured approach would have been preferable, with personnel sheltering in place where appropriate and departures phased according to evolving risk, available transport options, and operational realities.
Passport mobility and dependent data. Although many organisations had collected core employee data, including nationalities, residential addresses and dependent details, significant gaps were frequently identified too late. In particular, manywere unaware of the nationalities of spouses and dependants, resulting in delays as critical information was gathered during the crisis itself. These shortcomings also complicated evacuation planning. Plans to move personnel by road across land borders quickly encountered difficulties when it emerged that some employees and family members did not hold passports that permitted visa-free travel, forcing organisations to reassess routes, obtain additional documentation, or identify alternative means of evacuation.
Confronting these challenges carried significant time and cost implications. While retaining specialist providers or securing access to transportation assets required upfront investment, organisations with gaps in their preparedness found themselves competing for scarce resources under crisis conditions. This often resulted in sharply inflated costs, reduced availability, and difficult decisions being made under pressure, highlighting the value of pre-established arrangements and operational readiness.
Continue the series
Understanding the readiness gap is the first step. In Part 2: The shift to intelligence-led operations, we explore how integrating real-time intelligence into leadership decisions helped organisations hold their nerve, sequence movements safely, and act with confidence, plus a practical checklist of what to do before the next flashpoint.