Shipping disruption linked to attacks or interference by states is normalising as part of an emerging world order. Maritime security professionals used to focus on the threat from pirates, smugglers and terrorist groups to commercial vessels. Now, states are increasingly becoming the biggest threat to maritime supply chains.
In late 2026, sustained, state-driven attacks are being targeted at commercial shipping in three critical waterways simultaneously: the Strait of Hormuz, the Black Sea and the Red Sea. The intent is to sink ships and damage cargoes and, in some cases, actively seek to put seafarers lives at risk. Each attack also threatens to escalate or trigger fresh geopolitical tensions. But these are just the overt attacks. In an increasingly fragmented world order with declining adherence to international norms and laws, the complex and often opaque world of shipping provides a uniquely permissive environment in which states can target their adversaries and project power.
States can exploit ambiguities surrounding vessel affiliation and location. A single vessel can have links to numerous jurisdictions through its flag, ownership, operator, management, chartering arrangements, origin or destination, but targeting one of those connections does not necessarily translate into a perceived attack on the associated state. Likewise, disrupting shipping or operations in an adversary’s Exclusive Economic Zone, extending up to 200 nautical miles offshore, can send a powerful message without directly targeting sovereign territory. Put simply, states have far greater room for coercion and plausible deniability at sea than they do on land.
This insecurity poses a direct threat to the maritime industry and indirectly to all businesses reliant on it. Investors and law firms also need to be aware of the increasingly complex threat environment relevant to deals and disputes involving vessels and ports. The perpetrators will not just be the usual suspects, those formally at war, in the usual chokepoints, or in ways that may instantly be recognisable.
These are the trends to watch:
The sharp end
Overt attacks
Often, the balance of power is and will remain in favour of the insurgents. Naval forces have proved unable and/or unwilling to come to the commercial world’s rescue. Most are simply ill-equipped to protect all ships from advancing missile and drone technology, leaving them either sidelined or performing roles that do little to safeguard vessels and, in turn, meaningfully restore trade. Where naval coalitions do emerge, any rhetoric of defending freedom of navigation for all, irrespective of affiliation, will not match reality.
Takeaway: While refraining from deploying their navies, expect greater state involvement in the commercial maritime sector, including direct vessel ownership and state-backed insurance schemes to fill the gap left by unwilling charter markets.
Covert operations
Alongside the overt campaigns, covert actions by states targeting commercial vessels will become more common. These will be discreet, deniable and carefully calibrated to signal reach and willingness to escalate. Affected states may be reluctant to publicly attribute these incidents, as doing so would raise difficult questions around the vulnerability of shipping and critical maritime infrastructure.
Takeaway: Uncertainty over responsibility can complicate incident response, insurance claims, contractual disputes and decisions about whether, or when, to resume operations.
Making life uncomfortable
Even where ships are not physically attacked, those linked to politically sensitive trades or offshore projects will increasingly face growing coercion at sea. Naval and coast guard vessels will shadow, harass and occasionally obstruct vessels, backed by threatening radio warnings, signal interference and demonstrations of force. The objective is not necessarily to inflict physical damage, but to increase the risk, cost and inconvenience of operating until companies withdraw or decide not to bid for future contracts, or use alternative routes.
Takeaway: Investors evaluating contentious trades or offshore projects will need to assess whether sustained interference could threaten commercial viability.
From missiles to paperwork
Iran’s declared intention to charge for passage through the Strait of Hormuz has raised questions about payment for passage through global waterways. Widespread tolling remains unlikely. Rather than the cheque book, some states will attempt to use (and abuse) the rule book by weaponising regulations or making novel legal interpretations of rules and practices to obstruct targeted trades. Where international maritime law or domestic legislation offers even a veneer of legitimacy, it will be stretched to its limit. Where it does not, that is unlikely to prove much of a constraint.
Seizures
Regulatory breaches, real or alleged, will increasingly serve as a pretext for vessel seizures at sea. When individual NATO states have interdicted Russia-trading vessels, the stated justification was that they were stateless. In practice, these moves have signalled to Moscow its geographic vulnerability to a naval blockade in a future open conflict. As sanctions become an ever more prominent tool of foreign policy and economic statecraft, more vessels will be individually designated and seized for violations when the opportunity presents itself.
Takeaway: Understanding vessel ownership, trading history, sanctions exposure and its wider network of commercial affiliations is critical before entering a transaction, charter or voyage.
Bureaucratic blockades
States that already possess degrees of management over waterways, whether man-made canals or narrow straits, will increasingly weaponise that position. Transit permits can be delayed, fees adjusted, inspections intensified and marine services selectively restricted to pressure adversaries and disrupt targeted trades. In other words, state can use actual or claimed responsibility for safe passage to constrain trade.
Rather than imposing outright blockades, states with revisionist ambitions are more likely to normalise control incrementally. This could begin by asserting regulatory, customs or “law enforcement” powers over waters in their sights. Then, measures progressively escalate – starting with simply being there, then ramping up interactions with commercial traffic – until the exceptional becomes normal and the contested becomes controlled.
Takeaway: Identifying this form of incremental coercion early will be critical, particularly for businesses making long-term investment, contracting or supply-chain decisions.
Holding trade hostage
Politically motivated vessel detentions in ports and anchorages will become a more common and more consequential tactic. Detentions will typically be justified through maritime safety requirements – for example customs breaches, environmental concerns or alleged crewing issues – which are then exploited for political or security purposes. Some states could push these tactics further offshore, asserting powers in their Exclusive Economic Zones that are, legally, restricted to other maritime zones. In most cases, the vessels will ultimately be let go. When prolonged, detention can turn a seaworthy vessel into a constructive total loss, leaving insurers to absorb the cost.
Outright vessel bans are a much blunter instrument but nevertheless a credible, albeit less likely risk. Ships may be banned because of their flag, or because they belong to shipping companies widely associated with the target country.
Takeaway: Organisations should consider how bilateral disputes over ostensibly ‘onshore’ issues, particularly those involving countries with large flag registries or shipping lines, could spill over into the maritime domain.
Managing maritime risk
By combining geopolitical and security intelligence with maritime expertise, dispute support and expert witness capabilities, Control Risks helps organisations assess exposure, evidence their decisions and respond when disruption becomes a material business issue.
Our team can be reached at [email protected].